




he classic moral hazard model studies the problem of how a princi-
pal should provide incentives to an agent who operates a project for
him. In this model, the principal only observes the realized output
and not the agent’s effort. Consequently, the agent must be induced to work
hard with compensation that depends on performance. Because many con-
tracts explicitly tie rewards and punishments to performance, the model is
a workhorse of modern economics, with applications to insurance contracts,
employee and executive pay, sharecropping contracts, corporate ﬁnance, and
bank regulation, to name just a few.
In the moral hazard model the exact dependence of compensation on
performance depends on the relationship between the agent’s input and the
project’soutput. Mostanalysistakesthisrelationship,ortechnology,asgiven;
that is, something that cannot be modiﬁed by the principal.
There are many situations, however, where the principal has some control
overthistechnology. Forexample,aprincipalcandesignaproductionprocess
sosomeoutcomesaremorelikelythanotherswhencertaininputsareapplied.
A production line can be designed so that if sufﬁcient care is not supplied, it
willbreakdown. Inagriculture,thefertilizer,thetypeofseed,andotherinputs
all effect the stochastic properties of production. Debt contracts frequently
includeloancovenantsthatputrestrictionsontheactivitiesofaborrower,such
asworkingcapitalrequirements.1 Financialregulationworkssimilarly. Banks
have limits on their activities. For example, a bank cannot lend more than a
set fraction of its assets to a single borrower. Similarly, money market mutual
funds are limited to investing in short-term, safe, commercial paper, and as a
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 See Black, Miller, and Posner (1978) for more information on loan covenants as well as
connections with bank regulation.
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consequence they have a very different risk proﬁle than banks, even though
the money market liabilities are close substitutes to some bank liabilities.
In each of the above examples, the principal has some choice over the
functional relationship between the agent’s actions and his output. In the
agricultural case, the connection is through use of inputs. For debt contracts,
loan covenants are used to keep a borrower away from potentially dangerous
conditions. Inthemoneymarketandbankregulationexamples,theinvestment
restrictions reduce the variance of returns.
The purpose of this article is to work out some of the implications of this
line of thought.2 Only some are explored because there are many different
dimensions along which the technology could be changed. Consequently, the
analysis is necessarily limited and mainly exploratory. Still, it emphasizes the




determining the technology and starkly illustrates how powerful this margin
may be. It also demonstrates that this margin strongly affects the optimal
contractualform. Thesecondexamplelimitstheprincipaltochoosingbetween
only two technologies, but it demonstrates that the principal may be willing to
choosealessproductivetechnology, asmeasuredbyexpectedoutput, because
it reduces the incentive problem. In this example, the limited choice among
technologiesismotivatedbytheinteractionbetweenaprincipal’sdecisionand
inferences made from ﬁnancial market prices. In particular, the principal’s
decision to liquidate the ﬁrm alters the informativeness of market prices.
1. THE MODEL
In the basic moral hazard model, the agent chooses an action a that combines
with a random shock to produce output q. In this article the principal has
some control over how a interacts with the randomized shock to produce
output. The choice made by the principal is called the technological choice
and is indexed by i. The relationship between the inputs and the output is
described by the conditional probability distribution function pi(q|a).F o r
simplicity, q is assumed to take on only a ﬁnite number of values. Of course,  
q pi(q|a) = 1. Finally, based on the output, the principal pays the agent
his consumption c.
2 The moral hazard literature touches on this issue, but the implications and importance of this
idea may not be fully appreciated, since the results are scattered across different applications. One
important application of this idea is in the task assignment model of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) and Itoh (1991). They study how to assign workers to tasks, which in turn affects the
technology faced by an agent. One paper, however, that explicitly considers the principal’s choice
of technology is Lehnert, Ligon, and Townsend (1999).E. S. Prescott: Technological Design and Moral Hazard 45
Preferences
The agent cares about his consumption and his effort. His utility function is
U(c)−V(a), with U strictly concave and V increasing in a. The principal is
risk neutral so he only cares about the project’s surplus, that is, q − c.
The principal offers the agent a contract that consists of three items: the
principal’s choice of technology, what action the agent takes, and how the
agent is paid as a function of the output. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1 A contract is a technological index i, a recommended action a,
and an output-dependent compensation schedule c(q).
The agent has an outside opportunity that gives him ¯ U units of utility. For
this problem, this means that the contract has to give him at least that amount
of expected utility before he will agree to work for the principal. Therefore, a
feasible contract must satisfy
 
q
pi(q|a)U(c(q))− V(a)≥ ¯ U. (1)
Thepointofthemoralhazardproblemistogeneratenontrivialdependence
of consumption on output. But from what has been described to this point,
there is little reason to expect such a nontrivial dependence. For example, if
the agent is risk-averse, that is, U is strictly concave, then an optimal contract
fullyinsurestheagentagainstvariationsinoutput, payingtheagentaconstant
wage with the principal absorbing all the risk in output.
Dependence of consumption on output is generated by assuming that the
agent’s action is private information; that is, the principal does not observe
it. Consequently, the principal must set up the compensation schedule c(q)to
inducetheagenttotaketherecommendedaction. Inducementmeansherethat
given c(q) it is in the agent’s best interest to take the recommended action.
More formally, if the principal wants the agent to take a, then the contract






pi(q|ˆ a)U(c(q))− V(ˆ a), ∀ˆ a. (2)
A contract is called feasible if it satisﬁes constraints (1) and (2).3 The
principal chooses a feasible contract that maximizes his utility. We can ﬁnd
such a contract by solving the following constrained maximization program:
3 In mathematics, a program refers to the problem of choosing an object that maximizes (or







s.t. (1) and (2).
Analysis
To keep the analysis simple, assume that there are only two actions, al and ah,
with al <a h. The latter action gives the principal more expected output but





pi(q|ah)U(c(q)) − V(a h) ≥
 
q
pi(q|al)U(c(q)) − V(a l). (3)
Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions to the program, with (2) replaced by (3),
gives
−pi(q|ah) + λU (c(q))pi(q|ah) + μ(pi(q|ah) − pi(q|al))U (c(q)) = 0,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on constraint (1) and μ is the multiplier








Equation (4) describes the relationship between c(q) and the parameters
oftheproblem. EachLagrangianmultiplierisnonnegativeandwillbepositive
if its corresponding constraint binds. These variables affect consumption but




q then consumption increases with q. Inspection of (3) reveals why. When
this ratio is low, a high level of consumption rewards the agent relatively more
for taking ah than for taking al. Conversely when this ratio is high, a low
level of consumption punishes the agent relatively more for taking al than for
taking ah. The likelihood ratio determines when the principal should use the
carrot and when he should use the stick.
Conditions under which the likelihood ratio is decreasing in q include
the normal distribution and some others. (For more information see Hart and
Holmstr¨ om [1987] and Jewitt [1988].) Still, most distributions do not satisfy
this monotone likelihood property. This lack of robustness has always been
a concern for this class of models because most contracts are monotonic as
well as being simpler than those that solve the moral hazard program. For
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areoftenpaidaﬁxedwageplusapercentageofsales, sometimeswithabonus
for hitting performance targets.4
By choosing i, the principal is essentially choosing these ratios and, in
doing so, directly affects the severity of the incentive constraints. The above
analysis suggests that the principal will want to make this ratio high for some
outputsinordertousethestickandlowforothersinordertoprovidethecarrot.
If, as was argued earlier, the principal has some control over the properties
of the technology, then this will strongly affect technological design as well
as compensation schedules. The following examples are designed to explore
this idea.
2. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
This example examines the extreme case where the principal can only control
the probability distribution of output for the low action. The only restriction
on these probabilities is that the chosen distribution still needs to produce the
same expected output. In this problem, it is assumed that the solution is such
that the principal wants to implement the high action.
Eachchoiceofthetechnologyindexi correspondstoachoiceoftheentire
probability distribution over q given al. For this reason, it is convenient to
drop explicit reference to i and just let the principal choose the entire function
p(q|al).






subject to the participation constraint
 
q




p(q|ah)U(c(q)) − V(a h) ≥
 
q
p(q|al)U(c(q)) − V(a l), (6)
and the constraints on technology
 
q
p(q|al) = 1, and (7)
 
q
p(q|al)q =¯ q, (8)
4 See Townsend and Mueller (1998), however, for a description of sharecropping contracts
that are formally linear but in practice are much more complicated.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where ¯ q is the expected output amount that the distribution must produce.








The second set of incentive constraints comes from taking the derivative with
respect to p(q|al). Letting η be the Lagrangian multiplier on (7) and ν the
multiplier on (8), these conditions are
∀q, −U(c(q))μ + η + νq ≤ 0,( = 0i fp(q|al)>0). (10)
There is not necessarily an interior solution to this problem, so it is possible
that (10) holds at an inequality.5
Equation (10) implies that c(q) is monotonic over q such that p(q|al)>
0. Whether it is increasing or decreasing depends on the sign of ν.I t i s
importanttonotethatthisdoesnotmeanthatc(q)ismonotonicallyincreasing
everywhere. The result only applies for outputs for which p(q|al) is chosen




= λ + μ. (11)
Thus, consumption is the same for all of these values of output. Comparing
(11) with (9) and noting that μ>0 reveals that consumption is higher for
values of q that satisfy p(q|al) = 0 than for values that satisfy p(q|al)>0.
These results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal contract is characterized by the following fea-
tures: i) Consumption is a constant for all values of q such that p(q|al) = 0;
ii) Consumption is monotonically increasing or decreasing inq over values of
q such that p(q|al)>0; iii) Consumption levels for q such that p(q|al) = 0
are higher than consumption levels for q such that p(q|al)>0.
At ﬁrst glance, the monotonicity result is appealing because many con-
tractsaremonotonic. Butsincemonotonicityonlyappliestooutputsforwhich
p(q|al)>0, the degree of monotonicity will depend on the range of values of
output with this property. As the following analysis demonstrates, there only
needs to be two such outputs.
Proposition 2 Let Q ={ q|p(q|al)>0}. There exists a solution in which
there are no more than two outputs with q ∈ Q.
Proof: The variables p(q|al) only affect the right-hand side of the incen-
tive constraint, (6), and the constraints on the technological design, (7) and
5 Notice that it has been implicitly assumed that c(q) will be an interior solution.E. S. Prescott: Technological Design and Moral Hazard 49
(8). The lower the value of the right-hand side of (6) the less binding the
incentive constraint will be and the better the consumption schedule that can
be implemented. Consequently, for a given consumption schedule a solution









p(q|al) = 1, (12)
 
q∈Q
p(q|al)q =¯ q. (13)
This program is a linear program. If a solution exists to a linear program,
whichistruebyassumptionhere, thenabasicfeasiblesolutionexists. Abasic
feasible solution is one in which the number of non-zero valued variables is
less than or equal to the number of constraints. In this problem there are only
twoconstraintssothereisasolutionwhereallbuttwovariablesarenecessarily
zero. So if Q had more than two elements, their probabilities would be zero
and they would not be in Q. Q.E.D.
Thep(q|al)functionissettomaketheutilityfromtakingthelowactionas
low as possible. Consequently, the program puts as much weight as possible
on the lowest values of c(q). Proposition 2 shows that there needs to be
only two such points, which helps us characterize the compensation schedule.
Since only two outputs are in Q, p(q|al) = 0 for all other values of q.S ob y
(9)thevalueofconsumptionfortheseoutputsisaconstant. Thecompensation
schedule in this problem is a wage except for the one or two outputs for which
p(q|al)>0. Which one or two outputs will be chosen cannot be determined
without solving for the multipliers and all the other variables.
The goal of this exercise is to demonstrate the striking effect that tech-
nological choice by the principal can have on the properties of an optimal
contract. Still, the optimal contract with its punishments on two levels of
intermediate outputs does not look like contracts used in practice. Indeed, the
analysis suggests that the incentive problem will be relatively minor since the
low levels of consumption are only paid infrequently for the two outputs with
p(q|al)>0. Furthermore, the contract looks a lot more like a wage contract
than the pay for performance contracts the theory was designed to describe.
Fortunately, as the next section demonstrates, adding a small modiﬁcation
to the problem generates an optimal contract that is much more appealing
on “realism” grounds. In particular, it will be monotonically increasing and
relatively simple.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
A Monotonicity Extension
Assume now that the agent can costlessly destroy output and that the principal
does not know if he destroyed any output. All the principal observes is what is
left. Theagentdoesnotconsumeanyofthedestroyedoutput. Thisassumption
adds another source of private information to the problem; one that is easy to
analyze. Theabilitytodestroyoutputrequiresthatthecompensationschedule
c(q) be weakly monotonically increasing in output.6 Otherwise, the agent
could destroy some output and claim the higher consumption. If there are n
possibleoutputrealizationsandqj referstothejthoutput,thenthisassumption
requires adding the following constraints to the program.
for j = 1,...,n − 1,c ( q j) ≤ c(qj+1). (14)
An analysis of the amended program is not too different from that of the
earlier program. The ﬁrst-order conditions analogous to (9) only have some
additional multipliers for the monotonicity constraints. The remaining ﬁrst-
order conditions are the same as (10).
The addition of the monotonicity constraints prevents the solution to
the earlier program from being optimal. If the agent produced the one or
two outputs that correspond to p(q|al)>0—the outputs with the lowest
consumption—hecouldsimplydestroysomeoftheoutputandreceiveahigher
level of consumption that goes with his new lower output.
The optimal contract to the program with the monotonicity constraints
retains some of the same features as the solution to the earlier program. There
are still only one or two outputs for which p(q|al)>0. If there are two such
outputs, they split the contract into three distinct regions: one region less than
the lower of the two outputs, a middle region between the two outputs, and
a third region above the higher output. In the lower range consumption is a
constant and p(q|al) = 0, in the second region consumption is also a constant
but higher than the consumption of the ﬁrst point as well as higher than the
consumption in the ﬁrst region, and in the third region consumption is yet
again a constant but at an even higher level. The contract is a step function
withthreesteps. Itresemblesacontractwithawageandtwolevelsofbonuses
(or, a contract with a wage and one bonus level and one lower wage level for
poor performance, etc.). Figure 1 illustrates. The point is that the contract
keeps the desired monotonicity property and is relatively simple.
Proposition 3 An optimal contract to the program with the monotonicity
constraint is characterized by a compensation schedule that is: i) monotonic;
ii)characterizedbythethreeregionsdescribedabove;andiii)consumptionfor
6Adding this source of private information to the standard model is enough to generate
monotonic consumption but the optimal contract can still be complicated with lots of contingencies.
As will be shown, the combination of technological choice and monotonicity also simpliﬁes the
contract in important ways.E. S. Prescott: Technological Design and Moral Hazard 51
Figure 1 Optimal Compensation Schedule












Notes: Example of what an optimal compensation-sharing rule might be. It is broken into
three regions with a linear portion in each region. Consumption is weakly monotonically
increasing.
each of two outputs that separate the two regions is equal to the consumption
in one of the adjacent regions.
Proof: i) Follows directly from the monotonicity constraints (14). To
prove ii), use the same argument as before to argue that there are only two
output levels for which p(q|al)>0. These points are the boundaries. Below,
between, and above, there is full insurance within each region because if there
was not, consumption could be smoothed, which would deliver the risk averse
agent the same utility at lower cost to the principal and not affect incentives.
Finally, for iii), if consumption of either of these two points was not equal to
consumption in one of the adjacent regions, then consumption in the regions
could be made closer together without altering the agent’s utility. Analogous
to the argument in ii), this is a less expensive way for the principal to provide
utility to a risk-averse agent. Q.E.D.
There are two lessons to this example. First, the modiﬁcation generates
contracts that are appealing on observational grounds. Second, the principal52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Probability Distributions of Output and Expected Output for
EachAction
01 2 E(q|a)
al 1/3 1/3 1/3 1
ah ε 1/3 2/3-ε 5 / 3-2 ε
Notes: The parameter ε is nonnegative.
will try and design the technology so that if the agent slacks off (takes al),
certain outputs will be very likely. In particular, he wants off-equilibrium




cipal prefers a less-productive technology, as measured by expected output.
The reason for this counterintuitive result is that sometimes a less-productive
technology alters the likelihood ratios in such a way that the incentive con-
straint is relaxed enough to outweigh the loss in output.
There are three outputs, q1 = 0, q2 = 1, and q3 = 2. As before, there are
only two actions, al and ah. The production function is described in Table 1.
The exercise is to assume that ε ≥ 0 and then to vary it to illustrate how that
affects the solution. Expected output for the high action is higher than that of
the low output for any ε<1/3.
Theliteraldescriptionofthisproblemisdifferentfromthestandardmodel.
Mathematically,however,itwillbeidenticaltothemoralhazardprogram. The
description is useful because it better motivates the example.
Now, assume that q represents an intermediate valuation of the project’s
long-term prospects. The principal does not observe q. There is a market,
however, that trades securities based on the long-term value of the project.
The market observes q and prices its securities accordingly. Alternatively,
marketparticipantshavevaryingsourcesofinformationthatarecombinedand
communicated, however imperfectly, through the market price. Importantly,
the principal observes the market price and makes an inference about the true
q from it.
So far, the problem is no different than that of the standard model; the
principal does not observe q directly but he can infer it from the market price
of the security. Now, however, the principal has the option of liquidating theE. S. Prescott: Technological Design and Moral Hazard 53
Table 2 Probability Distributions of Output and Expected Output for
EachAction
01 2 E(q|a)
al 0 2/3 1/3 4/3
ah 01 /3 + ε 2/3 − ε 5/3 − ε
Notes: Principal liquidates whenever the traded security indicates that q = 0o rq = 1.
project right after q is created (and observed and traded upon by the market).
If he liquidates, the value of the project becomes one.
Markets, as always, are forward looking. In this context, this means that
the market takes into account the effect of the principal’s liquidation strategy
on the value of the project. For example, if the strategy is to liquidate the
project when the market price indicates that q = 0o rq = 1, then the market
will trade the security at a price that indicates that q = 1. Indeed, under this
liquidation strategy the security would never trade at a price of zero!7
The problem for the principal here is to decide on the best liquidation
strategy. If he does not liquidate, the technology is the one described in
Table 1. If the principal liquidates when the market price indicates q = 0o r
q = 1, then the principal has essentially chosen the probability distributions
to be those described in Table 2. No other feasible liquidation strategy is
preferable, so the other ones are not explicitly considered.
In the liquidation case, q = 1 is not literally the amount produced since
the agent may have produced q = 0, but liquidating turns it into an output
level of one. Because the principal chooses whether to liquidate, the principal
is essentially choosing between the probability distribution in Table 1 and the
one in Table 2. Thus, the program has been mapped into the mathematical
structure of the moral hazard program. Furthermore, for ε>0 expected
output in Table 1 is less than that in Table 2 for both actions. It is in this sense
that the ﬁrst technology is technologically inferior to the second technology.
Yet, as we will shortly see, the ﬁrst technology is sometimes superior when
incentive considerations are taken into account.
The two problems can be compared by merely contrasting the incentive
constraints. As before, assume that the principal wants to implement ah. The
no-liquidation incentive constraint, i.e., the one from choosing the technology
7 Related, a liquidation strategy of liquidating only when q = 0 would create an equilibrium
existence problem. Under this strategy, q = 0 would never be observed because the price would
be one. But if the price is one, the supervisor would never liquidate! Liquidating when the market
price is zero or one avoids this circularity.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in Table 1, is
(1/3 − ε)(U(c(q3) − U(c(q1))) ≥ V(a h) − V(a l). (15)
Theliquidationincentiveconstraint,i.e.,theonefromchoosingthetechnology
in Table 2, is
(1/3 − ε)(U(c(q3) − U(c(q2))) ≥ V(a h) − V(a l). (16)
The only difference between the two constraints is the replacement of
U(c(q1)) in (15) with U(c(q2)) in (16). This should not be surprising. Output
q1 is not produced in the liquidation case, so it is not a factor in that case.
The striking feature of this example is that for small enough values of ε
theprincipalpreferstheno-liquidationtechnologyeventhoughtheliquidation
technologyproducesahigherexpectedoutput(foreitheraction). Thebestway
to see this is to analyze the limiting case where ε = 0. Consider the contract
where the principal chooses the no-liquidation technology, sets c(q1) equal
to its minimum level and sets c(q2) = c(q3). Assuming that c(q1) can be
set low enough so that the incentive constraint (15) holds, then this solution
provides full insurance. Indeed, the incentive constraint (15) does not bind.
Becausetheagentchoosesah, theprincipalhasnotgivenanyoutputupbynot
liquidating and the low consumption for producing c(q1) is a very powerful
way of preventing the agent from choosing al.8 In contrast, if the principal
liquidated the project with this consumption schedule, the agent would take
al because he would never suffer the penalty from producing q1.
Asεgraduallyincreasesfromzero,theprincipalstartsforegoingoutputby
not liquidating. Still, for small values of ε the incentive effect of setting c(q1)
toalowvalueoutweighsthelossinoutputaswellasanycosttotheagentfrom
producingq1. (Asεgrows,theoptimalcontractwillnolongerprovideconstant
consumption over q1 and q2, and c(q1) will increase.) Consequently, the
“inferior”no-liquidationtechnologyispreferredtotheliquidationtechnology
for incentive reasons. Of course, as ε gets large enough, the output effect
will dominate the incentive effect and only then will the principal prefer the
liquidation strategy.
4. CONCLUSION
This article worked through two examples to illustrate the importance of tech-
nological design on moral hazard. The ﬁrst example gave the principal wide
latitude in designing the probability distribution. It illustrated the mechanics
of the approach and demonstrated that large effects on optimal compensation
schedules were possible. The second example studied a problem in which the
8 The likelihood ratio is inﬁnite in this case. What this is indicating here is that consumption
is not an interior solution and, in this case, is set to its lower bound.E. S. Prescott: Technological Design and Moral Hazard 55
liquidation strategy affected the informativeness of output. It demonstrated
that sometimes the principal was willing to forgo output in return for a more
informative distribution of output.
Themainconceptualdifﬁcultyintheseexamplesisdetermininghowmuch
latitude to give the principal in setting the probability distributions. What
choice to offer the principal will depend on the application. The second
example, with its problem of inferring true output from a market price, had
a natural way of limiting the principal’s control over the technology. Other
applications will suggest different dimensions to this choice. Regardless of
the application, what the analysis makes clear is that the technological design
dimension to the moral hazard problem is an important one. It affects the
surplus for the principal and the shape of the compensation schedule.
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